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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LAWRENCE SCOTT ROBERTSON,

]

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
UTAH FUEL COMPANY,

]i

Case No. 940147-CA

]
i
]

Priority No.

14(b)

Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH'S DISCLAIMER CASES ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE.
A.

Introduction

Plaintiff Lawrence Scott Robertson was summarily fired after
ten years of faithful, productive, and loyal service to Utah Fuel
Company (the "Company").

He was fired as punishment for his

admitted substance abuse problem.

(See Statement of Relevant

Facts, Brief of Appellant)

This was in direct violation of the

Company's

on Alcohol, Drugs, and

Approved

Policy

Controlled

Substances, which promised that those who voluntarily came forward
to request help would be offered
retribution.

treatment without

(See Appendix 4, to Brief of Appellant)

fear of
Robertson

was fired without first being provided with progressive discipline
as promised in the Company's employee handbook.
Both parties have cited the cases of Johnson v. Morton
Thiokol. Inc. . 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991) and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah.
Inc. , 844 P. 2d 331 (Utah 1992) in their initial briefs. The Company
has also referred to the recently decided cases of Kirbera v. West
One Bank, 236 Ut.Adv.Rep. 20 (Ct. App. April 1, 1994) and Sorensen
v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 236 Ut.Adv.Rep. 36 (Ct. App. April
11, 1994).

They argue that these cases are controlling.

A close

examination of these decisions reveals that Robertson's case is
clearly distinguishable on its facts, and the facts in this case
compel a reversal of the summary judgment.

B.

Kirbera v. West One Bank.

Kirberg v. West One Bank, supra, involved the termination
of Patricia Kirberg's employment as branch manager of West One
Bank's West Jordan branch.

She was fired for failing to report

what she had heard about the legal problems and criminal charges
against the infamous Dr. Robert Davis, a customer with substantial
deposits and a substantial existing loan.
could

not

discipline.

be

fired

without

cause

Kirberg argued that she

and

without

progressive

She based this on her "belief" that this was the

company's policy.
West

One

pointed

out that

Kirberg's

signed

employment

application contained a disclaimer of contractual liability.

In

addition to this, West One's Human Resource Manual contained an
2

"at-will" disclaimer.

This manual also provided that, "Depending

on the severity of the problem, disciplinary action may result in
progressive discipline, a negotiated voluntary separation, or
immediate involuntary separation."

[Emphasis added]

Later, these key portions of the manual were incorporated
into yet another separate booklet entitled "Code of Conduct."
Kirberg

received

a

copy

of

this

and

signed

a

statement

acknowledging that she had read it.
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment, finding
that Kirberg's observations and training that led her to the belief
that discipline should be progressive, and that she would not be
fired without cause, did not create a genuine fact issue sufficient
to defeat summary judgment.

Kirberg had failed to identify any

affirmative and definite acts of West One, demonstrating West One's
intent to modify its at-will contract with her.

The court held

that she had not raised a jury question as to whether West One
nullified its disclaimers and affirmatively offered her employment
other than at-will.
Plaintiff Robertson presents a much stronger case. His case
is based on a clear-cut company policy which is not contained
within the handbook and thus not subject to its disclaimers.
(Appendix 4, Brief of Appellant) The clear import of this policy,
as confirmed by the testimony of Robertson's supervisor, William
Shriver, as well as past company practices, is that those who
voluntarily come forward to request treatment, before being found
in violation of the policy, would be offered treatment, and would
3

not otherwise be sanctioned. On the other hand, violations of this
company policy "may" result in disciplinary action.
Unlike Kirberg, Utah Fuel's handbook is not at all equivocal
in its directives regarding progressive discipline.

It states at

page 14:
When these situations develop, it is very important
that they be handled fairly. To accomplish this, we
have implemented the following procedures:
STEP ONE:
If there is a problem with your
workmanship, safety, attendance, relationships with
others or similar matters, your supervisor will
discuss the problem with you. . . . [Emphasis added]
(Appendix 5, Brief of Appellant)
There

is

nothing

indefinite

in

the

directive,

supervisor will discuss the problem with you."
mandated!

"Your

This action is

West One's analogous provision stated:

Depending on the severity of the problem,
disciplinary action may result in progressive
discipline, a negotiated voluntary separation, or
immediate involuntary separation. [Emphasis added]
Kirberg, supra, at 21.

Utah Fuel has taken affirmative and

definite acts that clearly demonstrate its attempt to modify their
at-will contract with Robertson.

Thus, Kirberg does not support

Utah Fuel's position herein.

C.

Sorensen v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corporation.

Sorensen

v.

Kennecott-Utah

Copper

Corporationr

supra.

involves an appeal of the trial court's dismissal pursuant to Rule
41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(b) allows the
court in a bench trial to dismiss when "upon the facts and law the
4

plaintiff has shown no right to relief."

On appeal, the "clearly

erroneous" standard applies and the court must view the evidence in
a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Supra at 37.
The standard of review in this matter is, of course, quite
different.

In reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate court

must view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Sanderson v.

First Security Leasing Co.. 844 P.2d at 303 (Utah 1992).
Sorensen relied heavily on a 1973 company booklet entitled
"General Rules of Conduct" which was in use when he was first
hired. Sorensen argued that this document required termination for
cause only, and then only after a written warning, or a suspension
subject to hearing rights. Significantly, this 1973 Code had been
superseded by numerous revised editions, including a 1986 revision.
(Sorensen

was

terminated

in

1989.)

Unlike

the

1973 Code,

subsequent Codes required neither a written warning nor suspension
for rule violations. The 1986 Code simply stated, "[e]mployees who
do not conform to this general code of conduct will be subject to
discipline."
The Utah Court of Appeals held that such an amorphous threat
of discipline could not constitute a manifestation by the employer
that was "sufficiently definite" to demonstrate an intent to form
a relationship other than at-will.

Sorensen, supra at 40.

Utah Fuel's "Improvement and Progress Program" is mandatory.
It requires basically a verbal warning, a written warning, and a
suspension prior to termination.
5

There is nothing ambiguous or

equivocal in its directives, "Your supervisor will meet with you
periodically. . . .

These meetings will include . . . your

supervisor will discuss the problem with you . . . "

[Emphasis

added]
By contrast, Kennecott's 1986 booklet no longer required a
written warning or suspension with hearing rights.

It merely

stated that failure to conform one's conduct to the Code "will be
subject to discipline" without ever specifically defining what that
discipline would be.

This is clearly different from Utah Fuel's

policy.
Utah Fuel cannot now disclaim this self-imposed mandate.
Having announced this company policy, Utah Fuel may not now treat
its promise as illusory.

Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield

of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 at 895 (Mich. 1980).
Utah Fuel now argues that the handbook applied only to
hourly workers.

This argument fails scrutiny as well.

The

strongest argument against Utah Fuel is the handbook itself which
contains no such limitation within its 98 pages.

Moreover, both

William Shriver and the plaintiff testified that the handbook
applied to salaried and hourly workers alike.

The company argues

that references to "supervisor" in the handbook imply that it does
not apply to salaried workers.

This argument is meaningless as

Robertson was a supervisor, but he had a supervisor, Shriver.
Shriver had a supervisor, Zumwalt; and Zumwalt had a supervisor as
well, Vernal Mortensen.

(Zumwalt depo. at 140)
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Judge Scott Daniels, in Sorensen. found that references in
Kennecott's

handbook

to

"contact

a

shop

steward

or

union

representative" were supportive of Kennecott's claim that the
manual applied only to union employees.

The word "supervisor"

provides Utah Fuel no such corroboration. Moreover, ambiguities in
the handbook must be interpreted against Utah Fuel.

This Court

must view the facts in a light most favorable to Robertson.

This

Court must therefore accept as fact that Utah Fuel's handbook
applied as to Robertson.

D.

Johnson v. Morton Thiokolr Inc.

Plaintiff, in his initial brief, recounted the essential
facts of Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991)
and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992).

An

examination of the facts in these cases discloses that they are
clearly distinguishable as well.
In Johnson v. Morton Thiokolf supra, Bill Johnson relied
entirely on the company handbook to support his argument that he
could not be fired except for cause. He did not claim that Thiokol
had failed to comply with its own grievance procedures.

In fact,

Thiokol had followed its grievance procedure in accordance with the
handbook, and Johnson used this fact to support his cause argument.
The handbook contained a detailed disclaimer, more detailed than
the disclaimers used by Utah Fuel.

The Utah Supreme Court upheld

summary judgment on the basis of the disclaimer.

Despite this

disclaimer, the Supreme Court stated that Johnson would have been
7

entitled

to

challenge

his

termination

under

the

handbook's

procedures, though not the right to be fired only for cause.

Id.

at 1003.

E.

Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. Inc.

Hodgson v. Bunzl Utahr Inc.. supraf provides a good example
of what a company ought to do if it truly wants to inform its
employees that their employment is at-will.

Bunzl Utah, Inc.

informed its employees of their at-will status seven different
ways. (See Brief of Appellant at p. 30)

Hodgson was told in his

initial interview that his employment would be at-will.
Employee Checklist" further so advised him.
contained

five

specifically

different

informed

at-will

employees

The company handbook

references,

that

The "New

they

one

may

not

of

which

rely

on

progressive discipline.
Understandably, the Utah Supreme Court had no difficulty in
affirming summary judgment.

Nevertheless, the court noted, as it

had in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. supra, "An employer may be bound
to

follow

handbook."

any

discharge

procedures

outlined

in an

employee

Id. at 3 33.

Thus, both Johnson and Hodgson instruct us that an employer
may be bound to follow its own discharge procedures despite its atwill disclaimers no matter how extensive they may be. Under these
precedents, Robertson at a minimum, was entitled to the progressive
discipline as required in the company handbook prior to being
demoted or fired.
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POINT II
ROBERTSON'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS NOT BARRED BY THE WORKERS
COMPENSATION LAWS.
Utah Fuel has argued that Robertson's cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred by Utah's
workers compensation

laws.

This

is not correct.

Although

ordinarily workers are barred from suing their employers for onthe-job injuries, intentional injuries are the exception. Bryan v.
Utah International. 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975).
Plaintiff maintains that Utah Fuel fired him to punish him
for his substance abuse problem.

Prior to obtaining treatment,

Robertson's supervisors were completely unaware of his problem.
(Shriver depo. at 50, 61, App. 2, Brief of Appellant; Zumwalt depo.
at

35)

Neither

Shriver

nor

Zumwalt

had

seen

anything

Robertson's work performance to suggest he had a problem.

in
Id.

Yet, the day he returned to work following his treatment, Glen
Zumwalt, vice president and general manager of the mine, told him
he was being demoted four steps to "A-Pay Miner."
at 66, App. 3, Brief of Appellant)
reason

for this

demotion

Zumwalt told Robertson the

was because

(Robertson depo. at 132-133,

(Zumwalt depo.

of

his drug

problem.

App. 1, Brief of Appellant)

Utah

Fuel's motive was punitive and this was done with the intention of
causing Robertson severe emotional distress. Plaintiff has indeed
suffered severe emotional distress as a result of these events.
(Robertson depo. at 67-68, App. 2, Brief of Appellant)
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that a managerial employee/s
tortious intent can be imputed to his or her own employer if the
employee acted within the scope of his authority and was motivated
either in whole or in part to carry out the employer's purposes.
Hodaes v. Gibson Products Co. r 811 P.2d 151 at 157 (Utah 1991).
Zumwalt was clearly acting within the scope of his authority
when he fired Robertson, thus his tortious intent will be imputed
to Utah Fuel Company as a matter of law.
compensation bar does not apply.

Therefore, the workers

(See also, Retherford v. AT&T

Communications, 844 P.2d 949 at fn. 8 (Utah 1992))

CONCLUSION
The doctrine of employment at-will creates a mere rebuttable
presumption that the employment relationship can be terminated at
the will of the employer.

This presumption can be overcome by

proof of the existence of an implied-in-fact employment contract.
The existence of an implied-in-fact employment contract is a fact
issue.
Plaintiff Robertson has established competent evidence that
an implied-in-fact employment contract existed between him and Utah
Fuel Company.

That contract provided that Robertson would not be

sanctioned for voluntarily coming forward to seek substance abuse
treatment.

The contract further reguired that Robertson would not

be demoted or fired, except for violation of certain specified acts
establishing good cause.

Moreover, sanctions would not be imposed

without first providing Robertson with progressive discipline.
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Robertson was fired after voluntarily coming forward to
obtain treatment in reliance on Utah Fuel's promise. He was fired
for having done so.

He was fired without having first been

provided with progressive discipline in further violation of the
parties7 implied-in-fact contract.
Utah Fuel attempts to shirk its contractual obligations by
asserting that it had disclaimed all such responsibilities.

Utah

Fuel thus seeks to reserve to itself the right to depart from and
treat as illusory all of its promises.

This it cannot do.

The

courts have stated that disclaimers cannot serve as an eternal
escape hatch for an employer to make whatever unenforceable
promises it is to its benefit to make.
Defendant Utah Fuel Company is not entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

This Court should therefore reverse the lower

court's ruling and allow this matter to be decided by the jury.
DATED this

/(

day of May, 1994.
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